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nflation in the euro area remains stubbornly low.  The headline consumer price 
index hovers around zero and even core inflation remains below 1%, which might 
be due to the second bout of weakness in oil (and other commodity) prices this 
year.  Inflation is falling across the globe, and deflationary tendencies remain even in 
the longer-term expectations as the inflation expected five years out is also falling.  But 
are lower oil prices a sound reason for central banks to keep monetary policy easier 
for longer? 
The Federal Reserve left rates unchanged on September 17th, although many had 
argued that the real economy data, especially on the labour market, would have 
justified an exit (from the zero interest policy). 
No similar decision on exit is in sight in the euro area. But some have argued that the 
ECB should consider further easing measures (pushing the deposit rate deeper into 
negative territory or increasing the size of its asset purchase program).  But should 
further easing measures be even discussed at this point?  
The ECB is aiming only at price stability. But the strength with which it eases policy 
when (HICP) inflation is below the target (of close to 2%) should take the 
macroeconomic environment into account.  It is one thing to use non-standard 
measures when deflation is due to insufficient demand.  But it is another to prolong 
these measures when deflation is due to cheaper supply. 
For both the US and Europe, the gain from cheaper oil is important and could be worth 
up to 3% of GDP if one takes into account that other commodity prices have also fallen.  
But this positive aspect seems to be forgotten by monetary policy-makers for whom 
cheap oil also has a negative side as it exacerbates the deflationary tendencies in the 
advanced countries which, in any event, seem to be mired in a low-growth trap while 
their central banks appear incapable of generating the inflation rate of 2% which most 
hold necessary for a proper functioning of the economy.   
But why is deflation bad? 
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One key argument for the euro area in particular is that it makes it harder for debtors, 
especially those in the euro-area periphery, to service their debt.   
The fear that the technical deflation caused lower oil prices is bad for debtors is 
unfounded because it is based on a misunderstanding.  What matters for debt-service 
capacity is the income of the debtors, not the general price level.  With lower oil prices, 
the real income of households should go up as they have to spend less on fuel and 
heating. Lower oil prices thus make life easier for highly-indebted households in the 
US or in the euro-area periphery.  Falling consumer prices should thus in this case be 
taken as a good sign. 
Most manufacturing enterprises will also benefit from lower energy costs, and thus be 
better able to service their debt. This is again particularly relevant in the euro-area 
periphery where the non-financial sector accumulated too much debt during the credit 
boom until 2007-08.  Moreover, most of the savings in energy costs might initially show 
up in higher profits, but, over time, competition will force enterprises to pass on some 
of these windfall gains in the form of lower prices or higher wages.  This is another 
important aspect of cheap oil: wages can increase to some extent without leading to 
(consumer price) inflation.  Cheap oil will thus make it more difficult to judge the point 
at which wage pressures become inflationary.   
Central banks all over the world have chosen not to aim for absolute price stability, 
but rather for some increase in the price level of about 2%, because they fear the 
downward rigidity of wages.  In a constantly changing economy, some prices need to 
go up, relative to the general prices, whereas others need to go down.  These 
fluctuations around the average are easier to achieve when very few prices have to go 
down.  The same applies to wages. It is easier to achieve relative wage adjustment 
when the average moves up slightly so that few wages have to fall in nominal terms.  
However, with oil prices falling, this argument loses much of its force since wages 
might be able to increase even if (consumer) prices do not.  This is another reason why 
central banks should be less concerned about the persistence of low inflation. 
Public finances should also benefit from the deflation or low inflation engendered by 
falling oil prices.  Government revenues depend on the value of domestic production, 
i.e. GDP, and not only consumption.  Lower oil prices depress consumer prices, but 
should boost production and GDP.  Absent large price changes for raw materials, the 
consumption price index, which is usually used to measure inflation, evolves along 
with the price deflator for the entire economy (the GDP deflator).  But this will not be 
the case this year since consumer prices are falling, but the GDP deflator (and nominal 
GDP) is still increasing.  This should lead to solid government revenues, which is good 
news for highly-indebted governments throughout the industrialised world, but 
particularly for the euro-area periphery. 
Figure 1 below shows that until 2007 the consumer price index tracked by the ECB and 
the GDP deflator followed almost exactly the same trend.  But this changed when the 
global crisis hit. A large gap opened up, as consumer prices increased by over 5 
percentage points more than the GDP deflator.  During this period the actual economic 
conditions were thus tighter than the average HICP inflation rate of 1.8% (2008-14) 
would lead one to suspect, as the GDP deflator increased only by a little over 1% per 
annum).  
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Figure 1. HICP and GDP deflator compared 
 
  
Source: Own calculations based on ECB data. 
Part of the gap might be due to a fall in productivity, but most of it was due to the 
period of high oil prices until mid-2014.  The gap has narrowed and the GDP deflator 
is now increasing by about one percentage point more than the HICP (which is almost 
flat). The relative turnaround in the relationship between GDP deflator increases and 
the HICP inflation rate the ECB if focusing on is thus close to 2 percentage points.  This 
implies that economic conditions will become much easier in the euro area even if the 
ECB does not fully achieve its target of close to 2 %. 
The near-deflation fall in (consumer) prices, which the euro area is experiencing right 
now, should thus be seen as a positive development.  The euro-area periphery in 
particular can look forward to an ideal combination of low interest rates, a favourable 
euro exchange rate and a boost to real incomes from cheap oil.  Lower oil prices might 
make it more difficult for the European Central Bank to achieve its target of an inflation 
rate close to 2%, but in reality lower oil prices represent a boon for Europe and in 
particular for the beleaguered euro-area periphery. 
Much of the impact of lower oil prices comes with a delay. This implies that the ECB 
might be mistaken even if it looks at (HICP) inflation for the medium term. When oil 
prices went up, the ECB chose to ‘look through’ the temporary impact, it should do 
the same now that oil prices continue to fall. 
In practical terms this suggests that there might be no need for the ECB to prolong its 
asset purchase programme, even if inflation remains below 2% by end 2016.  
